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GLADSTONE REALTORS V. VILLAGE OF BELLWOOD: 
EXPANDING STANDING UNDER THE FAIR 
HOUSING ACT 
Gary M. Haber* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 17, 1979 the United States Supreme Court rendered its 
decision in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood (Glad-
stone).1 In a decision written by Justice Lewis Powell,s the Court 
interpreted section 812 of the Fair Housing Act of 19688 as provid-
ing standing for a municipality and four individuals residing within 
a section of that municipality targeted for racial steering to sue 
local realtors who allegedly practiced racial steering. 
At first glance, the Gladstone decision4 appears to be merely a 
narrow, technical interpretation of certain provisions of the Fair 
Housing Act.' Upon closer inspection, however, the decision may 
• Staff member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
1 441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
• Justice William Rehnquist entered a dissenting opinion in the case, id. at 116. See text 
at notes 179-94 infra.. 
• 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970). 
• It should be emphasized that the Supreme Court's decision in Gladstone resolved only 
the question of the standing of the plaintiffs. The Court did not decide the merits of their 
claim. As the Court stated, "We conclude that the facts alleged in the complaints and re-
vealed by initial discovery are sufficient to provide standing under Art. III [of the Constitu-
tion]. It remains open to petitioners, of course, to contest these facts at trial." 441 U.S. 91, 
115 (1979). 
The Supreme Court overruled the district court, which had granted defendants' motion 
for summary judgment in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for lack of standing. Village of 
Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, No. 75 C 3587 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1976); Village of Bellwood 
v. Robert A. Hintze Realtors, No. 75 C 3589 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1976). 
I Also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1968, (Title VIII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). 
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have a far greater impact. It removes a major impediment to court 
challenges by municipalities and their residents against real estate 
brokerage firms that engage in the practice of racial steering. Mu-
nicipalities and their individual residents are better able to protect 
the demographic integrity of their communities than prior to the 
Gladstone decision. The decision affords them an effective and ex-
pedient means of protecting the racial balance in presently inte-
grated communities. These parties argue that the effect of the de-
cision is to allow residents of an integrated community and indeed 
the municipality itself to thwart the efforts of realtors who would 
seek to alter arbitrarily the racial balance and cause the resegrega-
tion of the community.-
Beyond its holding, the Gladstone case can be viewed as resolv-
ing a clash between competing interests. One interest consists of 
those persons already residing in a neighborhood, both blacks and 
whites, who enjoy its integrated character and seek to preserve it. 
In addition, the municipality itself may, as in Gladstone, wish to 
maintain its present racial heterogeneity. The second interest is 
comprised of persons not already residing in the neighborhood but 
who wish to move there.7 In implicitly choosing between these two 
competing interests, it appears that the Court in Gladstone has 
come down in favor of those persons already residing in an inte-
grated community who seek to maintain the current racial balance. 
The effect that the decision will have on newcomers wishing to 
move into a community and alter that balance remains to be seen. 
This article focuses on the Gladstone case and its significance in 
the development of case law in the area of standing to sue under 
• The proponents of this view proceed on the assumption that an integrated neighbor-
hood can absorb only a certain percentage of minority residents. Once the optimal number 
is exceeded, white residents begin to leave the neighorhood. A substantial exodus of white 
homeowners in turn provides openings for additional black residents. Eventually, it is ar-
gued, 80 many whites move out and so many blacks replace them that the neighboorhood is 
segregated anew. The plainti1fs in Gladstone claimed that the two local realtors provided 
the catalyst for the exodus of white residents by funneling black homebuyers into the neigh-
borhood to the point where they exceeded the optimal number. 
• In Gladstone, the neighborhood under discussion was a desirable place to live not only 
because of its integrated character but because of its suburban location. Those wishing to 
gain access to such a neighborhood claim that they have a right to reside wherever they 
wish, regardless of the effect their entry might have on the neighborhood's present racial 
mixture. They view the actions of those already residing in the community as a thinly veiled 
attempt to exclude blacks and other minorites from these suburban communities. Not sur-
prisingly, those seeking entry have been joined in their protestations by real estate brokers 
who stand to make a profit by placing these people in the community. 
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the Fair Housing Act. As will be explored further, Gladstone re-
solved a difference of opinion among the lower federal courts. The 
courts had previously disagreed as to the class of plaintiff who may 
pursue an immediate judicial remedy under section 812 of the Fair 
Housing Act. The alternative would require that the plaintiff first 
pursue administrative and available state and local remedies under 
section 810 of the Act. In Gladstone, the Court held that the mu-
nicipality and individual residents of a neighborhood targeted by 
local realtors for racial steering met the requirements for standing 
under section 812. Although the plaintiffs could not claim that 
they themselves had been steered, the Court found that they had 
alleged sufficient injury traceable to the actions of the realtors to 
surmount the standing requirements of injury in fact and causa-
tion contained in Article III of the Constitution.8 
Secondly, the Court held that its prudential limitations posed no 
impediment to granting the municipality and its residents stand-
ing. In the majority opinion, Justice Powell interpreted standing 
under section 812 as being as broad as permissible under the con-
stitutional grant of power to the judiciary in Article III, and fur-
thermore concluded that the Court's prudential limitations were 
not applicable. 
In analyzing the Gladstone decision, this article will first ex-
amine the practice of racial steering that lies at the root of the 
dispute in the case. It will define steering, describe the ways in 
which it is practiced, identify the motivational factors that prompt 
it and examine its effect on communities and individuals. 
Second, the article will discuss the Fair Housing Act, under 
which the plaintiff-respondents- brought suit. It will examine the 
purpose behind the statute and compare the two enforcement pro-
visions, sections 810 and 812. Previous interpretations given by 
courts to these two sections will be discussed in detail. 
Third, this article will analyze the decision in Gladstone in 
terms of the three major issues addressed by the Court: (1) 
whether sections 810 and 812 provide alternative forms of relief to 
a similar class of plaintiffs, (2) whether plaintiffs met Article III 
• "The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made 
under their Authority .... n U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added.) 
• For purposes of clarity, the Village of Bellwood and its individual residents, respondents 
before the Supreme Court, will be referred to throughout this article as the plaintiffs. Glad-
stone Realtors, petitioners before the Supreme Court, will be referred to as the defendants. 
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standing requirements and (3) whether the Court's own prudential 
limitationslO prohibit standing. 
Finally, this article will explore the impact of Gladstone on the 
Fair Housing Act and on the law in general. Attention will be given 
to the possible effect of the decision on the practice of racial steer-
ing in the future. 
II. THE PRACTICE OF RACIAL STEERING 
One commentator has summarized steering as follows: 
Basically, steering can be described as a process by which realtors at-
tempt to guide a particular buyer away from or towards housing in a 
specified area. Usually, this practice is premised on the notion that the 
buyer will be either incompatible or unacceptable to the residents of a 
housing area due to his race, religion or national origin, or that the 
residents of an area will be unacceptable to that buyer due to racial, 
religious or ethnic differences.11 
Although realtors engage in steering along lines of religion and eth-
nic group membership, the most prevalent practice is steering of 
prospective home buyers based upon their race. 
Racial steering is usually practiced in one of two ways: "(1) ad-
vising customers to purchase homes in particular neighborhoods on 
the basis of race and (2) failing, on the basis of race, to show or to 
I. The term "prudential limitations" is used in this article to refer to restrictions, not 
mandated by the Constitution, which the Supreme Court imposes on itself to restrict the 
exercise of its jurisdiction. "Apart from the jurisdictional requirement, this Court has devel-
oped a complementary rule of self-restraint. for its own governance (not always clearly dis-
tinguishable from the constitutional limitation) which ordinarily precludes a person from 
challenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the rights of others (citations 
omitted)." Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). 
An early reference to theBe self-imposed limitations is found in Justice Brandeis' concur-
ring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936). Justice Brandeis stressed that 
the prudential limitations have the effect of preventing some cases from coming before the 
Court even though they are within its jurisdiction under the Constitution. "The Court de-
veloped, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of 
rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all constitutional questions 
pressed upon it for decision." [d. at 346. 
In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967), the Court turned its attention to its own prudential 
limitations. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan noted that the Court must exercise its 
jurisdiction in a prudent fashion. "The powers of the federal judiciary will be adequate for 
the great burdens placed upon them," he wrote, "only if they are employed prudently .... " 
[d. at 131. A full discussion of the elements of these prudential limitations is presented in 
the text at notes 166-78. 
11 Note, Real Estate Steering and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 12 TULSA L.J. 758, 760 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Real Estate Steering]. 
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inform buyers of homes that meet their specifications."12 Realtors 
typically engage in the first method of steering by discouraging 
white customers from purchasing homes in integrated neighbor-
hoods. Such neighborhoods are described negatively by realtors as 
"changing" or "busted." Neighborhoods with smaller or no concen-
trations of blacks are described in more favorable terms. 
Realtors practice the second method of steering in a variety of 
ways. They may misrepresent to prospective black purchasers the 
availability of housing in white neighborhoods,13 maintain different 
sets of listings for black customers than for white customers, or 
selectively advertise properties in black areas in publications read 
primarily by blacks. 14 
Real estate agents engage in steering for a variety of reasons, 
some of which have more to do with maximizing profits than with 
any particular approval of racial segregation in housing. It has 
been suggested that most brokers share an ideology that promotes 
steering.1II Prior to 1950, this ideology was reflected in the Code of 
Ethics of the industry's major trade association. Ie 
Despite the real estate industry's present official policy of non-
discrimination, brokers continue to act in accordance with their 
shared beliefs.17 Brokers may steer white buyers from and black 
buyers to integrated neighborhoods in the belief that this satisfies 
'" Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 809-
10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker]. 
18 See ego Howard v. W.P. Bill Atkinson Enterprises, 412 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Okla. 1975). 
This practice is prohibited by section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act which makes it unlaw-
ful "[t]o represent to any person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin that 
any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale or rental when such dwelling is in fact so 
available." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1976) . 
.. Real Estate Steering, supra note 6, at 761 n.16. 
.. This ideology takes the form of five core beliefs shared by most brokers. These beliefs 
are: "(1) most whites don't want black neighbors, (2) property values decline as blacks move 
into white neighborhoods, (3) integrated neighborhoods eventually become resegregated, (4) 
whites are hurt financially and socially by sales to blacks in white areas, (5) selling to blacks 
in white areas is an unethical business practice."Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker, 
supra note 7, at 811 n.17. See also HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE 
BROKERS, 143-54 (1969). 
'8 Until 1950, Article 34 of the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate 
Boards (NAREB) . read, "[a] realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a 
neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality or 
any individual whose presence would clearly be detrimental to property values in that 
neighborhood." In 1950, NAREB deleted the reference to race. In 1973, NAREB became 
known as the National Association of Realtors (NAR). Racial Steering: The Real Estate 
Broker, supra note 7, at 811 n.14. 
17 Id. at 811. 
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the preferences of prospective home buyers and of those presently 
residing in the area.18 In this case, the broker may not view his 
practices as discriminatory but as merely accomodating the segre-
gative tendencies of others. 18 
Most importantly, steering produces income for brokers. In or-
der to guarantee the steady flow of listings required for a success-
ful real estate office, the realtor must avoid upsetting potential 
sellers of homes. One court has taken note of the fact that, "[o]ne 
certain way to risk offending large numbers of homeowners in 
white neighborhoods was and is to introduce black buyers or even 
prospective black buyers to the neighborhood."20 
Realtors may also employ steering in conjunction with a 
"blockbusting" strategy. The realtor may induce whites to sell 
their homes in a particular neighborhood by suggesting that an in-
flux of black home buyers is imminent. The broker then proceeds to 
steer black buyers into the area to replace the departing whites. 11 
Regardless of the motivation behind it, steering by brokers has 
had an injurious effect both on those who are steered and on the 
communities involved. Steering impedes the attainment of the 
goals of the Fair Housing Actll which are, (1) eliminating the feel-
ing of shame felt by those who are discriminated against in the sale 
or rental of housing,18 (2) promoting freedom of choice in housing 
and (3) fostering integrated neighborhoods.24 
When realtors steer, they insult the dignity of their black cus-
tomers and of the residents of black areas.211 By restricting the 
range of housing opportunities available to a particular buyer 
based upon his race, steering forecloses freedom of choice in hous-
'8 [d. at 812. 
10 [d. 
'0 United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140, 1156 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
OJ Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker, supra note 7, at 812. Congress recognized the 
problem of blockbusting by realtors in enacting the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Section 804(e) 
makes it unlawful, U[f)or profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent 
any dwelling by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighbor-
hood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 
U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976) . 
•• 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). See note 3 supra . 
•• In floor debate, Senator Walter Mondale stated that the statute u ••• simply removes 
the opportunity to insult and discriminate against a fellow American because of his 
color .... What we are determined to do is to remove this blight from American society." 
114 CONGo REc. 5643 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976) . 
•• Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker, supra not.e 7, at 823. 
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ing.28 Finally, steering thwarts residential integration by maintain-
ing segregation of some neighborhoods as well as promoting the 
resegregation of racially mixed neighborhoods.27 
Steering has come under great attack because of the harmful ef-
fect it has upon the community in which it is practiced. Steering 
can cause a neighborhood to become racially transitional. As one 
court has graphically described, life in a racially transitional neigh-
borhood takes its toll on property values and on the collective 
psyche of the residents.28 In recognition of the severity of this 
problem, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1968. 
III. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 1968 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 known as Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968,28 has as its avowed purpose the provision of 
fair housing throughout the nation within the limits of the Consti-
tution.30 Earlier cases have interpreted the Act as designed to as-
•• Id . 
.. Id. As suggested in testimony before a Maryland commission which examined the prac-
tices of that state's relators in 1971: 
If the real estate industry could be persuaded to abandon the practice of steering their 
clients into racially segregated neighborhoods, there would be a much better chance of 
real integration in our metropolitan housing area. Under present practices, however, the 
evils of segregation are encouraged and perpetuated by some members of the real estate 
industry. 
Testimony of Bishop F. Joseph Gossman, Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore for the Roman 
Catholic Church before the Special Commission on Real Estate Practices at 2 (October 6, 
1971), cited in Note, Racial Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years Af-
ter, 33 MD. L. REv. 289, 324 n.175 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Racial Discrimination.] 
.. As one court has noted: 
First, a sense of panic and urgency immediately grips the neighborhood as rumors 
circulate and recirculate about the extent of the intrusion (real or fancied), the effect on 
property values and the quality of education. Second, there are sales and rumors of sales, 
some true, some false. Third, the frenzied listing and sales of homes attracts real estate 
agents like flies to a leaking jar of honey. Fourth, even those owners who do not sell are 
sorely tempted as their neighbors move away, and hence those who remain are peculiarly 
vulnerable. Fifth, the names of successful agents are exchanged and recommended be-
tween homeowners and frequently the agents are called by the owners themselves, if not 
to make a listing then at least to get an up-to-date appraisal. Constant solicitation of 
listings goes on by all agents either by house-to-house calls and/or by mail and/or by 
telephone calls to the point where owners and residents are driven almost to distraction. 
United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd 474 F.2d 115 (5th 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976). 
I. "It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for 
fair housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976). 
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sure fair housing practices, II to prevent discrimination in the sale, 
rental, financing or brokerage of private housing and to provide 
federal enforcement for remedying such discrimination, I. to end 
the unfairness of racial discrimination forever, II and to require 
that local housing authorities and federal agencies take affirmative 
steps to eliminate discrimination in housing. U 
Section 8031• lays out the coverage of the statute. According to 
section 803(a)(2), the prohibition against discrimination in the sale 
or rental of housing applies to all dwellings, including those sold or 
rented by a realtor." Section 803(b) contains the only exemptions 
from the coverage of the Act; the exemptions cover single-family 
homes sold or rented by an individual owner without the use of the 
services of a realtor and without the use of discriminatory advertis-
ing.17 The Act also exempts the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" landlord 
o' Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1247 (6th Cir. 1974), on remand 394 F. 
Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1976» . 
.. Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1133 (2d Cir. 1973) (con-
struing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 and 3608(d) (1976» . 
.. Zuch v. Huasey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 3601 
(1976». 
M Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973) (construing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976» • 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (1976). 
.. The prohibition of discrimination in the sale or rental of housing specifically applies to 
dwellings owned or operated by the federal government, 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (a)(I)(A) (1976); 
dwellings made available either wholly or partially by loans, advances, grants or contribu-
tions from the federal government provided that payment in full has not been made before 
April 11, 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (a)(I)(B) (1976); and dwellings made available through 
federal urban renewal programs, 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (a)(I)(D) (1976). 
07 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (b)(l) (1976) states that: 
Nothing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection (c» shall apply to (1) any 
single-family house sold or rented by an owner: Provided, That such private individual 
owner does not own more than three such single-family houses at anyone time: Provided 
further, That in the case of the sale of any such single-family house by a private individ-
ual owner not residing in such house at the time of such sale or who was not the moat 
recent resident of such house prior to such sale, the exemption granted by this subsec-
tion shall apply only with respect to one such sale within any twenty-four month period: 
Provided further, That such bona fide private individual owner does not own any inter-
est in, nor is there owned or reserved on his behalf, under any expreaa or voluntary 
agreement, title to or any right to all or a pOrtion of the proceeds from the sale or rental 
of, more than three such single-family houaea at anyone time: Provided further, That 
after December 31, 1969, the sale or rental of any such single-family house shall be ex-
cepted from the application of this subchapter only if such house is sold or rented (A) 
without the use in any manner of the sales or rental services of any real estate broker, 
agent, salesman or of such facilities or services of any person in the busineaa of selling or 
renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such broker, agent, salesman, or 
person and (B) without the publication, posting or mailing, after notice, of any advertise-
ment or written notice in violation of section 3604(c) of this title; but nothing in this 
1980] GLADSTONE REALTORS 791 
who rents out rooms in her home, provided that the dwelling is 
occupied by no more than four families living independently of 
each other.3s 
Section 804 is that portion of the statute which prohibits various 
discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of housing.39 In recent 
years, several courts have declared steering to be illegal as it vio-
lates section 804.40 Section 804(a) makes it unlawful to "refuse to 
sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to 
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or 
deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin."41 Most courts that have held that steering vio-
lates the Fair Housing Act have done so under section 804(a),4. on 
the grounds that racial steering serves to make unavailable or deny 
a dwelling to a prospective buyer on the basis of race. 
One lower court, however, cited section 804(b) in holding steer-
ing to be illegal.43 That section prohibits discrimination on the ba-
sis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in the provision of 
brokerage services or in the conditions of rental or sale.44 There are 
three additional subsections of section 804 aimed at prohibiting 
discriminatory real estate advertising,411 misrepresentation of a 
dwelling's availability48 and the blockbusting techniques employed 
by brokers.47 
proviso shall prohibit the use of attorneys, escrow agents, abstractors, title companies, 
and other such professional assistance as necessary to perfect or transfer the title .... 
o. 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (b)(2) (1976). 
o. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1976) . 
•• Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975); Fair Housing Council of Bergen 
County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 
(D.N.J. 1976); United States v. Henshaw Bros., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974); Zuch 
v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich. 1973) and 394 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D. Mich. 1975), 
aff'd and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977)~ 
41 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976) . 
•• See, e.g., Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Real Es-
tate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Fair Housing Council of Bergen 
County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 
(D.N.J. 1976); United States v. Henshaw Bros., Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974); 
United States v. Robbins, Vol. 1 E-Op. HSING. RPTR. (P-H) § 13,655 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Zuch v. 
Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich. 1973) and 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1047 (E.D. Mich. 1975), 
aff'd and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1976) . 
• 0 Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486, 488 
(E.D. N.Y. 1977) . 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1976) . 
•• Id. § 3604(c) . 
•• Id. § 3604(d). 
47 Id. § 3604(e). 
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The Fair Housing Act provides two avenues through which a 
complainant may challenge a broker's racial steering practices. 
Section 810 establishes a mechanism that combines administrative 
enforcement with the right to seek redress in the courts." Basi-
cally, this section allows "[a]ny person who claims to have been 
injured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes that 
he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice 
that is about to occur (hereafter 'person aggrieved') ... "4' to file a 
complaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. 
The complaint must be filed within 180 days after the incident oc-
curred.lIo If the Secretary decides after investigation to resolve the 
complaint, he shall proceed by "informal methods of conference, 
conciliation and persuasion. "111 
The Secretary must defer to state and local agencies whenever 
state or local law provides remedies substantially equivalent to 
those provided by section 810.11 If the state or local agency is una-
ble or unwilling to act, the Secretary may then proceed informally. 
If the Secretary is unable to obtain voluntary compliance, the com-
plainant may bring suit in federal district court against the alleged 
discriminator under section 810(d).18 
Section 812, on the other hand, does not require the complainant 
to pursue an administrative remedy before filing suit in federal 
court. M It allows the complainant 180 days after the alleged dis-
criminatory action occurred in which to bring the suit. II Unlike 
section 810 which employs the term "person aggrieved," section 
812 does not describe the class of complainants who may bring an 
action. It merely states that the rights granted by sections 803 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976) . 
•• [d. § 3610(a) • 
.. [d. § 3610(b). 
"' [d. § 3610(a). 
H [d. § 3610(c). 
II The statute reads: 
If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the Secretary or within thirty days 
after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) of this section, the Secre-
tary has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance with the subchapter, the person 
aggrieved may, within thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action in any appropriate 
United States district court, against the respondent named in the complaint to enforce 
the rights granted or protected by this subchapter, insofar as such rights relate to the 
subject of the complaint. . . • 
42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1976). 
If 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976). 
II [d. The plaintiffs in Gladstone sought relief under section 812. 
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through 80618 may be enforced, "by civlI actions in appropriate 
United States district courts without regard to the amount in con-
troversy and in appropriate state or local courts of general 
jurisdiction. "17 
In terms of remedies under section 812, the court may grant any 
permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order it deems 
appropriate. liS It may also award the plaintiff actual damages and 
up to $1,000 in punitive damages.19 In addition, the court may 
award reasonable attorney's fees where it determines that the 
plaintiff is unable to assume this expense.80 
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT PRIOR TO 
Gladstone 
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gladstone, lower fed-
eral courts differed as to the proper relationship between sections 
810 and 812. A majority of courts held that the sections were alter-
native measures open to all victims of Title VIII violations.81 One 
lower court, on the other hand, held that each section is available 
to a separate class of plaintiffs.8s As will be examined more closely, 
the Supreme Court in Gladstone validated this first construction 
of sections 810 and 812.88 
.. For a discussion of section 803 see text at notes 35-38, supra. For a dicussion of section 
804 see text at notes 39-47, supra. Section 805 is aimed at eliminating discrimination in the 
financing of housing. It makes it unlawful for banks, building and loan associations, insur-
ance companies, or other makers of commercial real estate loans to deny a loan or other 
financial assistance for purposes of constructing, renovating or purchasing a dwelling or to 
discriminate in the interest rate or other conditions bec.ause of the race, color, religion, sex 
or national origin of the applicant. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1976). Section 806 prohibits denial of 
membership and participation in or access to multiple listing services or other brokerage 
services on account of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1976) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1976) . 
.. Id. § 3612(c) . 
•• Id. 
eo Id. 
II See, e.g.; Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multi-
ple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071 (D.N.J. 1976); Howard v. W.P. Bill Atkinson En-
terprises, 412 F. Supp. 610 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Young v. AM Realty Co. of Greensboro, Inc., 
350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D. N.C. 1972); Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Ohio 1972); see 
also, Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Brown v. LoDuca, 307 F. Supp. 
102 (E.D. Wis. 1969) . 
•• TOPIC v. Circle Realty Co., 532 F.2d 1273, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 
U.S. 859 (1976). 
•• "The most plausible inference to be drawn from Title VIII is that Congress intended to 
provide all victims of Title VIII violations two alternative mechanisms by which to seek 
redress: immediate suits in federal district court, or a simple, inexpensive, informal concilia-
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In 1972, the Supreme Court decided the case of Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. CO .. 6f Two tenants, one black and one 
white, of a large San Francisco apartment complex filed a com-
plaint with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development al-
leging that the landlord's rental policies discriminated against non-
whites, as a result of which the tenants alleged injury.611 Since less 
than 1 percent of the tenants in the complex were non-white, the 
plaintiffs charged that they were stigmatized by living in a "white 
ghetto" and were deprived of the social and professional benefits 
that would have accrued from living with non-whites.66 
The plaintiffs brought suit under both section 810(a) of Title 
VIII and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, the Civil Rights Act of 1866.67 The 
plaintiffs in intervention (four additional residents of the complex 
and an unincorporated association of its residents), however, based 
their action on section 812 and section 1982.68 
The Court in Trafficante held that the two tenants were "per-
sons aggrieved" within the meaning of section 810(a) and thus had 
standing to sue under that section.6s The Court held that the defi-
nition of that term demonstrated a congressional intent to define 
standing under section 810 "as broadly as would be permitted by 
Article III of the Constitution. "70 In other words, the Court would 
not employ its own prudential limitations to further restrict stand-
ing so long as the Article III standing requirements were met. 
Although the Trafficante Court ostensibly based its grant of 
standing on section 810, some lower courts have concluded that the 
decision would support standing under section 812 in an identical 
situation.71 One court cited the decision's failure to expressly state 
tion procedure to be followed by litigation should conciliation efforts fail." 441 U.S. 91, 104 
(1979) . 
.. 409 U.S. 205 (1972) . 
•• 1d. at 206-07 . 
.. 1d. at 208 . 
•• 1d. at 206-07. Section 1982 provides that, "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have 
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
(1976) . 
.. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 1971). For a 
helpful discussion, see, Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen 
County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1082 (D.N.J. 1976) . 
• 1 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) . 
•• 1d. at 209. See note 8 supra. 
71 "Although the Supreme Court focused on § 3610 in Traf/icante, it mentioned § 3612 
without distinguishing it. The Court's failure to do so, particularly since it declined to reach 
the question of standing under § 1982 [42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)] at [Trafficante v. Metropoli-
• 
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that the case was decided only on grounds of section 810 and not 
section 812 as evidence that standing under both sections 810 and 
812 was as broad as permissible by the case or controversy require-
ment of Article IIPIi Although hesitant to read Trafficante as con-
trolling on the question of standing to sue under section 812, one 
court thought it significant that the decision expressly declined to 
address the issue of standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 but did not 
expressly decline to consider standing under section 812.78 
While several lower court decisions suggested that sections 810 
and 812 provided alternative forms of relief to an identical class of 
persons (i.e. anyone having been injured by a discriminatory hous-
ing practice whether or not the discrimination was aimed at them 
directly),74 one lower court suggested that the sections were aimed 
at different classes of plaintiffs. According to the Ninth Circuit's 
decision in TOPIC v. Circle Realty CO.,711 the immediate access to 
federal courts provided by section 812 is available only to those 
who are the direct victims of discrimination.78 Those who claim the 
less direct injury of having been denied the benefits of living in an 
integrated community must proceed under section 810.77 
TOPIC involved a fact situation similar to Gladstone. Individual 
residents of the affected community and an unincorporated civil 
rights organization brought suit to end the alleged practice of ra-
cial steering there by a local realtor.78 The plaintiffs, none of whom 
had actually been subjected to racial steering, complained of inju-
ries nearly identical to those complained of by the plaintiffs in 
Trafficante. 79 Unlike Trafficante however, the plaintiffs brought 
this case under section 812.80 
The court ruled that because they were not the direct victims of 
discrimination in that they had not been steered, the plaintiffs 
tan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,] 209 n.8 lends support to the view that the Court's ruling 
extends to both §§ 3610 and 3612." Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna 
Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486, 490 (E.D. N.Y. 1977) . 
•• [d. See note 10 supra . 
.. Fair Housing Council of Bergen County v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing 
Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1082 (D.N.J. 1976) . 
•• See note 61 supra . 
•• 532 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976) . 
.. [d. at 1276 . 
.. [d. at 1275 . 
.. [d. at 1274 . 
.. [d. at 1275. 
eo [d. 
• 
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lacked standing under section 812.81 Section 812 remedies were re-
served only for the direct victims of discrimination.82 
The court also distinguished the injury suffered by the plaintiffs 
in TOPIC from that suffered by the plaintiffs in Trafficante. The 
court suggested that racial steering by realtors in suburban com-
munities may be less responsible for discriminatory housing pat-
terns than are discriminatory rental policies in a single apartment 
complex.8s 
V. THE Gladstone CASE 
The issue in Gladstone centered on whether the plaintiffs had 
brought suit under the appropriate section of the Fair Housing Act 
to challenge the steering practices of local realtors Gladstone and 
Hintze. The original plaintiffs were the Village of Bellwood, a mu-
nicipality and suburb of Chicago in western Cook County, the 
Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, a non-
profit corporation active in fighting segregation in housing, and six 
individuals.M Four of the individual plaintiffs were white home-
owners residing in a twelve by thirteen block area of Bellwood 
targeted for racial steering by the brokers.8& The fifth individual 
was a black homeowner residing in Bellwood but outside the target 
area.88 The sixth individual was a black resident of the neighboring 
community of Maywood.8' 
As area residents became concerned that local realtors were di-
recting blacks desirous of obtaining housing in the western suburbs 
., Id . 
•• Id. at 1276. 
•• As the court noted: 
The plaintiffs here are not residents of a single apartment complex but rather of a 
section of metropolitan LOB Angeles with a population exceeding 100,000. Therefore, the 
role played by defendants' alleged racial steering in denying the plaintiffs the benefits of 
living in an integrated community may be so attenuated as to negate the existence of any 
injury in fact. It is quite possible, that even absent the defendants' discriminatory prac-
tices, Carson and Torrance would still be segregated communities. 
(citation omitted) TOPIC v. Circle Realty Co., 532 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1976) . 
.. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 93 (1979) . 
•• Id. at 95 . 
.. Id. at 95 n.3 . 
• 7 Id. at 93. The Supreme Court granted standing only to the four individuals residing 
within the target neighborhood but did not consider the standing of the two individuals 
residing elsewhere. "Although we intimate no view as to whether persons residing outside of 
the target neighborhood have standing to sue under § 812 of Title VIII, we do not foreclose 
consideration of this question if, on remand, the District Court permits respondents Perry 
and Sharp to amend their complaint to include allegations of actual harm." Id. at 113, n.25. 
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to Bellwood and concurrently steering white home buyers to other 
communities,88 the Village of Bellwood conducted an investigation 
of the practices of local realtors. This investigation, conducted with 
the assistance of five of the individual respondents who served as 
testers,88 concluded that Gladstone Realtors and Robert A. Hintze 
Realtors were engaging in steering. 
As a result of the investigation, the Village, the six individuals 
and the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities80 
brought separate suits against Gladstone and Hintze under section 
812 of the Fair Housing Act and section 1982 of the Civil Rights 
Act.81 
.. Prospective white homebuyers were steered away from Bellwood and to other commu-
nities including Berkeley, Westchester and Hillside. Within Bellwood itself, area realtors 
were showing blacks homes only in certain neighborhoods, notably those to the east. Homes 
in the western neighborhoods were shown exclusively to whites. Brief for Respondents, at 4. 
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for 
Respondents] . 
• t "A tester is instrumental in providing proof of a violation by posing as a purchaser with 
similar, if not the same criteria for housing and approximately the same personal character-
istics as the aggrieved party (price range, family size and neighborhood selection) except for 
the fact that the tester is of a different race. Any significantly different treatment of a tester 
by a realtor provides a good basis for a claim of racial discrimination. . . ." Real Estate 
Steering, supra note 6, at 770-71. 
The importance of testers in verifying incidents of steering has been recognized by the 
courts. See e.g., Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 234 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976); 
Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Youritan 
Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 647 n.3, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (and cases cited), aff'd as modi-
fied, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975); Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 
1146, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974). 
The investigation conducted by the Village concluded that although they requested simi-
lar housing in terms of price, size and general location, white testers were given listings in 
western Bellwood or in neighboring all-white communities while blacks were shown homes 
in eastern Bellwood or in other integrated neighborhoods. Brief for Respondents at 5. 
to The Court of Appeals determined that the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open 
Communities was without standing in that it failed to assert a specific injury to its 
members: 
The sole allegations are that racial steering interferes with the Council's mission and 
costs it funds to attack. But the Council's interest in open housing matters and its as-
serted commitment to effectuating that interest, albeit commendable, do not substitute 
for the concrete injury constitutionally required to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal 
court. Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1978). 
The Leadership Council was not among the plaintiffs when the case reached the Su-
preme Court. 
0' The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Village of Bellwood v. Glad-
stone Realtors, No. 75 C 3587 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1976) granted defendant's motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing under section 812 
because the TOPIC decision limited that section to the primary victims of discrimination. 
This analysis of TOPIC was expressly adopted by the district court in Village of Bellwood v. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Gladstone will be analyzed in 
terms of three questions. First, do sections 810 and 812 of the Fair 
Housing Act provide alternative forms of relief to a similar class of 
plaintiffs? The Court determined that they do. Second, have the 
plaintiffs met the Article III standing requirements? The Court de-
termined that they have. Finally, do the Court's own prudential 
limitations prohibit standing? The Court ruled that they don't.92 
A. Are Sections 810 and 812 Equally Available Alternatives? 
The majority opinion by Justice Powell interpreted sections 810 
and 812 as providing alternative forms of relief to both direct and 
indirect victims of discrimination.93 Justice Powell considered the 
resolution of this issue to be of critical importance, because if sec-
tion 812 is not available to the plaintiffs, then the Court need not 
consider whether they have met Article III standing require-
ments.94 
The Supreme Court's construction of sections 810 and 812 vali-
dated the interpretation given by the Court of Appeals, which had 
held that the Village of Bellwood and the individual plaintiffs 
could sue under section 812. The Court of Appeals stressed the 
fact that as the Fair Housing Act is designed, the primary means, 
of obtaining compliance is through complaints by private per-
sons.911 The same reasoning would be applicable, the Court of Ap-
peals stated, unless there were some reason to think that Congress 
intended sections 810 and 812 to apply to different sets of private 
litigants.98 In its examination of the legislative history, the lower 
Robert A. Hintze Realtors, No. 75 C 3589 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1976) in which defendant's 
motion for summary judgment was also granted. 
Both cases were consolidated for decision by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 
The circuit court reversed the district court and held that both the individual plaintiffs and 
the Village had standing to sue under section 812 . 
•• The respondents' 1982 claim was not considered by the District Court in Gladstone. 
"The Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to consider respondents' standing under § 1982. 
For this reason, and because of our decision with respect to respondents' standing under 
Title VIII, we do not reach the § 1982 issue." 441 U.S. 91, 116 n.33 (1979). 
os See note 63 supra. 
.. "The issue is a critical one for if the district court correctly understood and applied 
section 812, we do not reach the question whether the minimum requirements of Article III 
have been satisfied. If the court of appeals is correct, however, then the constitutional ques-
tion is squarely presented." 441 U.S. 91, 101 (1979). 
•• "This reasoning would surely apply here, unless there were some reason to think that 
Congress intended §§ 3610 and 3612 to serve different types of private litigants." Village of 
Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1019 (7th Cir. 1978) . 
.. [d. 
1980] GLADSTONE REALTORS 799 
court found no such intention. It dismissed the contention that 
section 810 was intended to be a " 'slower', less preferred route to 
relief for those less needy of immediate relief. "97 
The District Court in Gladstone, on the other hand, had adop-
ted the reasoning of the TOPIC v. Circle Realty Co. decision and 
had construed sections 810 and 812 as applying to different classes 
of plaintiffs. Section 812 was, the court held, limited to the direct 
victims of discrimination.98 The conciliation processes of section 
810, the District Court had held, were more appropriate to situa-
tions where no direct injury is involved and delaying access to the 
courts would not exacerbate the plaintiff's injuries.99 The Supreme 
Court decision had the effect of nullifying the District Court's con-
trary interpretation of sections 810 and 812. 
The Supreme Court in Gladstone refused to accept the defen-
dants' contention that the sections were not alternatives but that 
direct victims of discrimination in need of quick relief, may pro-
ceed under either section while indirect victims may proceed only 
under section 810.100 Such an interpretation, the Court deter-
mined, was inconsistent with both the terms of the statute and its 
legislative history. 101 
First, nowhere does the language of section 812 suggest that it is 
open to a more limited class of plaintiffs than section 810. The 
absence of the words "person aggrieved" from section 812 does not 
indicate that it is more limited than section 810 which grants relief 
to any "person aggrieved". The Court noted that the phrasing of 
section 812 in the passive voice obviates the need to refer to the 
'7 Id. The Court of Appeals recognized that its interpretation of sections 810 and 812 as 
available to the same class of plaintiffs "may to some degree seem to offend a judicial 
penchant for consistency to say that Congress has, in the same act, established an adminis-
trative remedy and authorized plaintiffs at their discretion to bypass it." Id. at 1020. The 
lower court resolved this inconsistency by suggesting that Congress, in recognition of HUD's 
lack of coercive powers, intended to allow the complainant to choose between pursuing an 
administrative remedy and proceeding directly to the courts. Id . 
.. Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, No. 75 C 3587 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 1976). See 
Petition for Certiorari, Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) at app. 
p.6 [hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari] . 
.. Id. Plaintiffs argued that indirect victims of discrimination may also be in need of im-
mediate relief when they challenge the steering practices of brokers. Not only must these 
practices be halted quickly in order to minimize the adverse effects on the community but 
the residents must be shown that "the law can protect them from being panicked out of 
their homes." Brief for Respondents, at 37. 
'00 441 U.S. 91, 102 (1979). 
,., Id. 
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class of plaintiffs to which the section applies. l02 
In making this determination, the Court rejected the primary ra-
tionale offered by the defendants in support of their argument that 
section 812 applies to a narrower range of plaintiffs than section 
810. The defendants argued that the inclusion of the phrase in sec-
tion 810 broadened the class of plaintiffs who might sue under its 
provisions. lOS In a variety of other situations, they claimed, the 
phrase has been, "used to create an expansive right of access to the 
courts. "104 Since the inclusion of the phrase expands the class of 
plaintiffs who may utilize section 810 procedures, the defendants 
argued that the absence of such language from section 812 restricts 
its availability to those who have been directly discriminated 
'.1 ld. 
,.S ld. at 101. Plaintiffs on the other hand, claimed that the inclusion of the phrase "per-
son aggrieved" narrowed rather than broadened the class of plaintiffs who might make use 
of section 810. There was some question as to who had standing under H.R. 14765, a prede-
cessor of the fair housing legislation passed in 1968. Representative Cramer (R-Fla.) criti-
cized the bill because it did not limit standing to "persons aggrieved." He observed that 
under the public accomodations law, the right to sue was so limited. In the end, the phrase 
was not inserted in H.R. 14765. In Representative Cramer's opinion, this made standing 
broader than if this language had been included. Hearings on Civil Rights, 1966 (H.R. 
14765) before Subcommittee No.5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congo 2d 
Sess. 1203 (1966). 
, .. Brief for Petitioners at 23 n.6. Gladstone Realtors V. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners). See American Power and Light CO. V. 
SEC, 325 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1945); FCC V. Saunders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 
(1940); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. V. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 862-65 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The 
petitioners cited authority to the effect that when included in a statute, words of long estab-
lished meaning "are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to 
the contrary." Lorillard V. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 (1978), quoting Standard Oil CO. V. 
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911). 
In a slightly different context, Judge Jerome Frank of the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit discussed the meaning of the phrase "person aggrieved." He noted that the 
Supreme Court, has "construed the 'person aggrieved' review provision as a constitutionally 
valid statute authorizing a class of 'persons aggrieved' to bring suit in a Court of Appeals to 
prevent alleged unlawful official action or to vindicate the public interest, although no per-
sonal interest of such persons had been or would be invaded." Associated Industries V. Ick-
es, 134 F.2d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
In further support of their construction of the term "person aggrieved," the defendants 
pointed to two cases in the employment area. In both E.E.O.C. V. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439 
(6th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978) and Waters V. Heublein, Inc., 547 F.2d 466 
(9th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977), white employees sued under Title VII 
claiming that they had been injured by the racially discriminatory policies of their employ-
ers directed against others. The courts held that the employees, who alleged that they "suf-
fered from the loss of benefits from the lack of association with racial minorities at work," 
were "persons aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute. Waters V. Heublein, Inc., 547 
F.2d 466, 469 (1976). 
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against. 10& 
The Court reasoned further that it makes no difference that sec-
tion 812 speaks in terms of enforcing the rights granted by section 
804 yet that section does not grant a right to have one's commu-
nity protected from the harms of racial segregation.108 If Congress 
determined that standing under section 812 should be granted to 
the full extent of Article III and that prudential limitations should 
be disregarded, as long as the plaintiff suffers actual injury as a 
result of the defendant's conduct, he is entitled to prove that the 
rights of another granted by section 804 were violated and seek 
redress under section 812.10'1 "That respondents themselves are not 
granted substantive rights by § 804, hardly determines whether 
they may sue to enforce the § 804 rights of others,"108 the Court 
stated. 
The Court also rejected the defendants' contention that Con-
gress imposed administrative remedies in section 810 for indirect 
victims of discrimination so as not to flood the courts with litiga-
tion. loe Section 810, the Court reasoned, does not serve to screen 
cases out of the federal courts. Section 810(d) seems to give the 
complainant a right to commence an action in federal court 
whether or not the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
pursues or completes informal conciliation.110 
In addition, the Court was unpersuaded that the restriction of 
access to the federal courts in section 810 means that that section 
is directed at a larger class of plaintiffs than section 812.111 Under 
section 81O(c) the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development 
must suspend his efforts if local remedies providing protection 
equivalent to Title VIII are being carried forward and thus may 
delay the availability of judicial review under section 810(d). Sec-
,.. Petition for Certiorari, at 21. 
, .. 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979). 
'.7 Id. 
'.8 Id. 
'00 According to the defendants' brief, restricting immediate access to the judicial process 
to potential homebuyers who have themselves been steered, serves to preserve scarce judi-
cial resources for those most in need of them. Brief for Petitioners at 26, n.S. Plaintiffs 
argued that the potential homebuyer who has been denied the housing of his choice because 
of his race needs prompt judicial relief before that housing is sold or rented to another 
person. Petitioner's Reply Brief, at 7, Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Petitioners' Reply Brief). II. "[lIt is clear that § S10 does not serve as a screening mechanism to deflect certain 
classes of Title VIII grievances from the federal courts." 441 U.S. 91, 104 n.10 (1979). 
III Id. at 104 n.ll. 
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tion 810(d) further conditions civil action on the absence of 
equivalent state or local remedies.112 
The Court spent considerable time examining the legislative his-
tory of the Fair Housing Act.ll8 It concluded that the legislative 
history supports the view that sections 810 and 812 are alternative 
remedies available to the same class of plaintiffs.m The Court 
noted that the early bills on fair housing provided for a judicial 
remedy only.1lIi Administrative relief was added later in the belief 
that, "it would provide a more expeditious and less burdensome 
method of resolving housing complaints."1l8 
111 Plaintiffs argued that Congress had not intended that complainants exhaust all state 
and local remedies prior to filing suit under section 812. Brief for Respondents at 39. In-
deed, Congress recognized that local governments have played a role in creating and perpet-
uating segregated housing. See 114 CONGo REC. 2279-80, 2698-2703, 3422, 2281, 2527-28 
(1968) (remarks of Sens. Mondale and Brooke); Mayers V. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 632 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wright, J. concurring). Senator Mondale noted that " ... [Aln impor-
tant factor contributing to the exclusion of Negroes from such areas, moreover, has been the 
policies and practices of agencies of government at all levels," 114 CONGo REc. 2277 (1968) 
(remarks of Sen. Mondale). 
"8 As recognized by the Court in Trafficante V. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 204 
(1972), history of the Fair Housing Act is rather incomplete. Title VIII was introduced on 
the floor of the Senate as an amendment to H.R. 2516, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Thus, 
there are no committee reports examining the statute and "reliance must therefore be 
placed on hearings and debate." Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker, supra note 12, at 
821 n,49. 
11< 441 U.S. 91, 105 (1979). 
111 These bills were S. 3296, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 14770, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. 
(1966); H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Se88. (1966). 
Although these bills were all introduced in the 89th Congress, the successful fair housing 
effort actually began during the first session of the 90th Congress. On August 11, 1967, the 
House passed H.R. 2516 which provided protection to civil rights workers. The original bill 
contained no fair housing provisions. Senators Mondale and Brooke sponsored S. 1358 as an 
amendment to the bill. S. 1358 provided for the achievement of fair housing in three steps: 
first, in all federally-assisted housing; second, in all multi-dwelling housing; and finally, in 
all single-family residences, excluding "Mrs. Murphy" rentals. 
The Mondale/Brooke amendment was vehemently opposed by Southern Senators who in-
terposed numerous procedural delays to keep it from coming to the floor for a vote. To 
break the deadlock, Senator Dirksen proposed a substitute amendment to H.R. 2516. It 
emphasized more of a change in enforcement than in coverage, although it did remove from 
coverage single-family homes sold by an owner-occupant without the use of a broker. The 
Dirksen amendment reduced the enforcement powers of HUD, while increasing those of the 
Attorney General. It also contained the basis for what later became sections 810 and 812. 
The Dirksen amendment was passed by the Senate on March 11, 1968 by a vote of 71-20. 
H.R. 2516 was returned to the House with the fair housing amendment. It was passed 
unamended by the House on April 10 and signed by President Johnson on April 11, 1968. 
For a more detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see Dubofsky, Fair 
Housing: A Legislative History and A Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 149-66 (1969). 
110 441 U.S. 91, 105 (1979). Acdbrding to Representative John Conyers, (D.-Mich.), the 
reasoning behind adding an administrative remedy to H.R. 14765 was that: 
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The Court found no evidence that Congress intended to condi-
tion access to the courts on prior resort to the Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development.H' To the contrary, Title VIII did not 
provide the Secretary with the powers necessary to resolve a large 
number of cases, since Title VIII provides only informal concilia-
tory powers. This is unlike earlier fair housing proposals that 
would have provided him with substantive enforcement power,us 
including the power to issue "cease and desist" orders. 
The Court noted that it was the understanding of Representa-
tive Emmanuel Celler, who as chairman of the Judiciary Commit-
tee summarized the statute on the floor of the House, that sections 
810 and 812 provided alternative remedies to all complainants 
under Title VIII. U8 In explaining the bill, Celler did not suggest 
that section 812 was reserved for certain kinds of plaintiffs and the 
section 810 procedure for others. Nor did he classify any rights as 
exclusively enforceable by section 810.120 The Court noted that the 
Experience with comparable State and local agencies repeatedly has shown that the ad-
ministrative process is quicker and fairer. It more quickly implements the rights of the 
person discriminated against and also quickly resolves frivolous and otherwise invalid 
complaints. 
Conciliation is easier in an informal administrative procedure than in the formal judicial 
process. 112 CONGo REc. 18402 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Conyers). 
117 441 U.S. 91, 106 (1979). Plaintiffs contended that private suits were not to be re-
stricted since it was intended that they and not administrative action by HUD would consti-
tute the primary means of enforcing Title VIII. In Traffi,cante, the Court stressed that pri-
vate complaints under section 812 are the major means of obtaining compliance with the 
Act. Such persons "act not only on their own behalf but as private attorneys general in 
vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest priority." Trafficante V. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). The important role of private attorneys 
general is enhanced by the fact that, "Congress contemplated a very limited role for HUD." 
Green V. Ten Eyck, 572 F.2d 1233, 1242 (8th Cir. 1978). 
Complainants are authorized to act as private attorneys general in a variety of contexts 
where complete reliance on governmental prosecution would lead to piecemeal enforcement 
of the statute. Racial Discrimination, supra note 21, at 302. See e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1964), the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 
(1976) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976». 
118 441 U.S. 91, 106 n.15 (1979). 
118 [d. Representative Emmanuel Celler (D.-N.Y.) stated that, "[i]n addition to adminis-
trative remedies, the bill authorizes immediate civil suits by private persons within 180 days 
after the alleged discriminatory housing practice occurred .... " 114 CONGo REc. 9560 
(l968)(remarks of Rep. Celler). 
II. The plaintiffs also pointed to an exchange between Senator Sam Ervin, chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and a representative of the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards regarding section 406 of S. 3296, the precursor of section 812. In reference to 
the standing requirement under section 406, the NAREB representative confirmed Senator 
Ervin's understanding, "that it doesn't even have a requirement that the plaintiff shall have 
been refused the rental or purchase of real estate .... " Hearings on S. 3296, Subcommittee 
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Justice Department had a similar understanding of the relation-
ship between sections 810 and 812.121 
A report of the House Judiciary Committee further recognized 
that no distinction was intended to exist between sections 810 and 
812 as to eligible plaintiffs and remedies.122 Indeed, the report's 
use of the term "person aggrieved" to refer to potential plaintiffs 
under section 812 as well as the reference to the sections as alter-
natives indicates that the authors of the report believed that the 
two sections were intended to reach a single class of plaintiffs.123 
The Court found that the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the federal agency primarily responsible for the im-
plementation of Title VIII, has consistently treated sections 810 
and 812 as alternative remedial provisions.124 The Court has previ-
ously stated that great weight should be given to the agency's in-
terpretation of the statute.I1ti 
That the Department of Housing and Urban Development has 
treated sections 810 and 812 as alternatives is borne out by the 
enforcement regulations promulgated by the Secretary.126 Further-
more, HUD's internal handbook describes section 812 as an "addi-
tional remed[y] for discriminatory housing practices [that] may be 
pursued concurrently with the complaint procedure of [section 
810]."127 
on Constitutional Rights, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 395-96 
(1966). 
111 In explaining an amendment by Senator Dirksen containing the genesis of sections 810 
and 812, a Justice Department report stated that, "[i]n addition to the administrative rem-
edy provided through the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the bill provides 
for an immediate right to proceed by civil action in an appropriate Federal or State court." 
Memorandum of the Department of Justice, 114 CONGo REC. 4908 (1968), quoted in Brown 
v. LoDuca, 307 F. Supp. 102, 104 (E.D. Wis. 1969). 
lSI "Section 812 states what is apparently an alternative to the conciliation-then-litigation 
approach above stated: an aggrieved person within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory 
practice occurred, may, without complaining to HUD file an action in the appropriate U.S. 
district court." Memorandum of the House Judiciary Committee staff, 114 CONGo REc. 9608 
(1968), quoted in Brown v. LoDuca, 307 F. Supp. 102, 104 (E.D. Wis. 1969) . 
••• 441 U.S. 91, 107 n.18 (1979) . 
• 14 Id. at 107 . 
••• Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). See also Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (1979); Udall v. Tallman, 
380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) . 
••• The regulations state that, "[t]he person aggrieved (who files a complaint with HUD) 
shall be notified of the date of filing and of his right to bring court action under sections 810 
and 812." 24 CFR § 105.16 (1979). 
117 DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., TITLE VIII FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK 59 
(1971). In communicating with fair housing groups, municipalities and individuals opposed 
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The Court found unconvincing defendants' argument that be-
cause Title VIn is not to be used as an instrument of harassment, 
section 812 is to be limited to a narrower class of plaintiffs than 
section 810.128 "Nowhere does the history of the Act suggest that 
Congress attempted to deter possible harassment by limiting 
standing under § 812. Indeed, such an attempt would have been 
pointless given the relatively easy access to the courts provided by 
§ 810."129 
Nor did the Court think that its interpretation of standing under 
section 812 would cause so many complainants to choose it over 
section 810 that the latter provision would become meaningless.180 
As section 810 provides a simple, inexpensive means of informal 
conciliation, many people will continue to find it an attractive al-
ternative to pursuing judicial relief under section 812.181 
Finally, the Court noted that most federal courts have concluded 
that sections 810 and 812 are alternatives open to the same class of 
plaintiffs.18I The decision of the Ninth Circuit in TOPIC is the 
only case holding that the sections apply to different classes of 
plaintiffs. 
to racial steering, HUD has stressed the interchangeability of sections 810 and 812. Amicus 
Brief at 19-20, Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Amicus Brief]. See also Dep't of Housing and Urban Development Fair Housing 
U.S.A. (1976) . 
••• 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979). 
'" [d . 
• ao [d. at 108 n.20. Defendants claimed that section 810 demonstrates the intent of Con-
gress to rely heavily on the efforts of state and local officials in the attainment of fair hous-
ing goals. Were indirect victims of discrimination allowed to bypass state and local remedies 
and sue directly in federal court, defendants argued, the administrative machinery of sec-
tion 810 would atrophy for lack of use. Petition for Certiorari, at 20-21. 
... Even if section 812 is construed as applying to the indirect victims of discrimination, 
such victims will .for a variety of reasons continue to pursue administrative remedies under 
section 810. The costs of attorney's fees required to bring suit may be prohibitive. If the 
person's goal is to obtain housing, he may feel that the seller would be less likely to sell if 
pressed by a section 812 suit. Conversely, developers reliant on federal funds may be more 
susceptible to a complaint from HUD than to a private suit. Brief for Respondents at 36 . 
... See also Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 
486, 489-92 (E.D. N.Y. 1977); Village of Park Forest v. Fairfax Realty, Vol. 1 E-Op. HSING. 
RP'i'R. 11 13,699 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern 
Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1081-83 (D.N.J. 1976); How-
ard v. W.P. Bill Atkinson Enterprises, 412 F. Supp. 610, 611 (W.D. Okla. 1975); Miller v. 
Poretsky, 409 F. Supp. 837, 838 (D.D.C. 1976); Young v. AAA Realty Co. of Greensboro, 350 
F. Supp. 1382, 1384-85 (M.D. N.C. 1972); Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D. Ohio 
1972); Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88, 90-92 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Brown v. LoDuca, 307 F. 
Supp. 102, 103-04 (E.D. Wis. 1969). 
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B. Have the Plaintiffs Met Article III Standing Requirements? 
Having determined that the judicial remedy was available to the 
plaintiffs under section 812, the Supreme Court then had to decide 
whether the plaintiffs met the standing requirements imposed by 
Article 111.188 The issue of standing involves the question of 
whether a particular litigant is entitled to have a court hear a dis-
pute. The determination of standing involves both Article III con-
siderations, which will be examined first and the Court's own pru-
dential limitations on its exercise of jurisdiction,184 to be examined 
subsequently. 
The purpose of the Article III standing requirements is to elimi-
nate claims "in which the plaintiff has failed to make out a case or 
controversy between himself and the defendant. "1811 In order to 
make out a case or controversy, the plaintiff must allege that he 
himself has suffered actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
defendant's illegal conduct.l88 The Court found that the plaintiffs, 
both the individuals residing within the target area of Bellwood 
and the Village itself, suffered injury as a result of the illegal steer-
ing practices of the petitioners. IS? Thus, the plaintiffs made out a 
case or controversy under Article III and satisfied the constitu-
tional standing requirements. 
The Supreme Court's finding that both the Village and the indi-
vidual residents of the target area had asserted the injury needed 
to satisfy the standing requirements of Article III upheld the simi-
lar conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals. The lower court 
turned aside arguments to the effect that the injury alleged by the 
individual plaintiffs was not sufficiently concrete to support stand-
ing under Article 111.188 The Court of Appeals recognized that the 
plaintiffs were not bona fide homeseekers and thus were not them-
selves steered.lsB However, the lower court looked to the Traf-
,.. See note 8 supra . 
.. 4 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (standing involves both constitutional 
limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise). 
"" 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). 
, .. ld. citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 
(1978); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 260-
61 (1977); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976); Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). 
, •• 441 U.S. 91, 112-115 (1979) . 
... Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 1978). 
, •• ld. at 1015. 
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ficante decision for support.140 The Supreme Court in Trafficante 
cited language to the effect that "[w]hile members of minority 
groups were damaged the most from discrimination in housing 
practices, the proponents of the legislation emphasized that those 
who were not the direct objects of the discrimination had an inter-
est in ensuring fair housing, as they too had suffered."I.1 
The Court of Appeals stressed that the Village itself would suffer 
a substantial injury as a result of racial steering. As an area into 
which minority homebuyers are steered, the Village might suffer 
several dislocating effects. 142 
The District Court never reached the twin questions of whether 
the plaintiffs met the standing requirements of Article III and the 
Court's own prudential limitations. The District Court had granted 
defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing to bring suit under section 812.143 Thus, the Dis-
trict Court did not consider whether the plaintiffs satisfied the 
constitutional and prudential standing requirements. 
The Supreme Court discussed first the injury to the Village of 
Bellwood. The Village complained that the defendants' racial 
steering manipulated the housing market in a twelve by thirteen 
block area of the Village. H. Whites who would otherwise have pur-
chased homes there did not because defendant realtors did not 
show them available homes in the area.1•11 Some blacks, on the 
, •• "The person on the landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory hous-
ing practices; it is, as Senator Javits said in supporting the bill, 'the whole community' 114 
CONGo REc. 2706 (1968)." Trafficante V. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). 
,., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing and 
Urban Affairs of the Senate Subcommittee on Banking and Currency on S. 1358, S. 2114 
and S. 2280, 90th Cong., 1st Sesa. (1967). 
, •• These effects include an "unnaturally rapid population turnover, with destabilized and 
possibly negative effects on property values and thus on its municipal tax base, and a con-
ceivable increase in certain municipal problems to which a town such as Bellwood would 
have to commit resources in attacking them." Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 
F.2d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 1978). 
, •• Petition for Certiorari, at 7. 
, •• 441 U.S. 91, 109-110 (1979). 
, •• [d. at 110. One lower court has previously indicated that the reasons why families 
choose to live where they do are complex and are influenced by a variety of factors, over 
some of which, such as the crime rate, quality of schools and city taxes, realtors have little 
influence. United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140, 1146 (E.D. Mich. 1977). 
Another lower court, however, noted that real estate agents and multiple listing services are 
important intermediaries between buyers and sellers of real estate and that their influence 
extends far beyond any single transaction. If, as the court determined, the brokers operate 
in a racially discriminatory fashion, their pervasive influence preserves or extends segre-
gated housing patterns. Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen 
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other hand, purchased homes in the area solely because they were 
led to believe that homes in the same price range were not availa-
ble elsewhere in the Village.146 This complaint, the Court held, al-
leged that the area's racial composition was being affected. In es-
sence, an integrated neighborhood was being replaced by a 
segregated one.147 
The Court noted that racial steering can harm a community.u8 
If steering significantly reduces the number of home buyers in the 
market, the price will be deflected downward. This downward 
trend would be exacerbated if the increase in the area's minority 
population caused by steering precipitated an exodus of the re-
maining white residents.149 A significant reduction in property val-
ues, the Court stated, in turn, "directly injures a municipality by 
diminishing its tax base, thus threatening its ability to bear the 
costs of local government and to provide services. Other harms 
flowing from the realities of a racially segregated community are 
not unlikely."uo The Court concluded that if steering had robbed 
Bellwood of its racial balance and stability, the Village had 
standing. 1111 
The Court next considered whether the individual plaintiffs met 
the Article III standing requirements. 1II2 It determined that the in-
dividual residents of the affected neighborhood had suffered an in-
jury in fact due to the defendants' illegal conduct and thus met the 
County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1075-76 (D.N.J. 1976). 
". 441 U.S. 91, 110 (1979). 
'" Id. 
I •• "The adverse consequences attendant upon a 'changing' neighborhood can be 
profound. If petitioner's racial steering practices significantly reduce the total number of 
buyers in the Bellwood housing market, prices may be deflected downward." Id. 
'" Id. citing Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1030, 1054 (E.D. Mich. 1975), at/'d and 
remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977); Barrick Realty, Inc. v. Gary, 354 F. Supp. 126, 135 
(N.D. Ind. 1973), at/'d, 491 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 
1004, 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1971). at/'d sub nom, United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty. Inc., 474 
F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973). 
". 441 U.S. 91, 110-111 (1979). School segregation for example, is closely linked to segre-
gated housing patterns. See e.g., Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 717 (W.D. N.Y. 1970) 
(three judge court), at/'d, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 
REPORT 237 (1968); 114 CONGo REC. 2276 (1968)(remarks of Sen. Mondale). 
The Court has previously recognized that, "[t]here can be no question about the impor-
tance to a community of promoting stable, racially integrated housing." Linmark Associates, 
Inc. V. Willingboro Township. 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977). The plaintiffs in Gladstone further 
suggested that as a result of steering. the Village may suffer "an increase in municipal 
problems to which it will have to commit resources." Brief for Respondents at 12. 
'" 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979). 
'" Id. at 109. 
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case or controversy requirement of Article III. The Court noted 
that the individual plaintiffs did not claim standing in their capac-
ity as testers. IllS Thus, the Court did not reach this question. 
Rather, the individuals claimed standing as homeowners in a tar-
get area in which steering had been practiced. I II. They asserted in-
jury in that their community's transformation from an integrated 
to a predominantly black community deprived them of "the social 
and professional benefits of living in an integrated society."llill 
This was similar to the allegation of injury made by the plain-
tiffs in Trafficante. 11l6 The Gladstone court, noting the importance 
of the "benefits of interracial associations"lII7 and its recent state-
ment that non-economic injuries are sufficient to provide stand-
ing, lII8 concluded that this injury met the Article III standing re-
quirement of actual or threatened harm.m 
The Court found that for purposes of standing, the factual dif-
ferences between an apartment complex of 8,200 tenants as in 
Trafficante and a twelve by thirteen block residential neighbor-
hood as in Gladstone, were not controlling.160 The defendants had 
urged that this difference was crucial.l61 However, in rejecting this 
argument, the Court suggested that any factual differences might 
indeed favor the plaintiffs: "Apartment dwellers often are more 
mobile, with less attachment to a community as such, and thus are 
able to react more quickly to perceived social or economic changes. 
The homeowner in a suburban neighborhood such as Bellwood 
... [d. at 111. 
... [d . 
... [d. 
... The Court attached no significance to the fact that plaintiffs in Trat/icante alleged 
harm to the character of their community whereas the plaintiffs in Gladstone refer to harm 
to their society: 
Reading the complaints as a whole, and remembering that we encounter these allegations 
at the pleading stage, we attach no particular significance to this difference in word 
choice. Although an injury to one's "society" arguably would be an exceptionally genera-
lized harm or more important for Art. III purposes, one that could not conceivably be 
the result of these petitioners' conduct, we are obliged to construe the complaint favora-
bly to respondents, against whom the motions for summary judgment were made in the 
District Court. So construed, and read in context, the allegations of injury to the individ-
ual respondents' 'society' refer to the harm done to the carefully described neighborhood 
in Bellwood in which four of the individual respondents reside. 
441 U.S. 91, 112 (1979) . 
... Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) . 
••• Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972) . 
••• 441 U.S. 91, 112 (1979) . 
• 80 [d. at 113 . 
••• [d. 
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may well have deeper community attachments and be less 
mobile. "Iel 
The Court suggested, however, that in order to determine injury 
to the residents of a particular neighborhood whose racial composi-
tion has been manipulated, a court must look to the facts of the 
particular case. lea Some neighborhoods either because of their 
large size, heavy population or sparse population may be so lacking 
in shared commercial and social intercourse that there would be no 
injury to the individual residents.le4 
Although it determined that the social injury alleged by the 
plaintiffs was sufficient to support standing, the Court read the 
plaintiffs' complaint as alleging economic injury as well. The likely 
source of such economic injury would be decreased property values 
due to steering. The Court stated that decreased property values 
due to the behavior of another person is sufficient injury under Ar-
ticle III. However, the plaintiffs in Gladstone would have to prove 
before the District Court that the value of their property had de-
clined and that this was due to the steering practices of the 
defendants. lei 
••• Id. , at 113-114. One lower court also stated that the factual differences between an all-
white residential neighborhood and an all-white apartment complex are such that residents 
of the former suffer greater injury because they may have to travel a greater distance to 
enjoy interracial associations than do residents of the latter: 
Residents of an all-white complex need only look to the next residential facility for the 
interracial associations they desire. If the allegations here are true, residents of Bergen 
County may have to go to an entirely different neighborhood or community. Similarly, a 
completely white building is less of a 'ghetto' than a completely white neighborhood or 
community. That the cordon sanitaire has been drawn around an entire community 
rather than a single apartment complex does not render it lawful. 
Fair Housing Council of Bergen County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing 
Serv., Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1081 (D.N.J. 1976) . 
••• 441 U.S. 91, 114 (1979) . 
... Id . 
... "Convincing evidence that the economic value of one's home has declined as a result of 
the conduct of another certainly is sufficient under Article III to allow standing to contest 
the legality of that conduct." Id. at 115. As plaintiffs' brief states, " ... there is more here 
than the desire of afBuent whites to have some black neighbors." Brief for Respondents at 
13 n.6. 
The individual plaintiffs in Gladstone further alleged concrete injury due to racial steer-
ing in that they may feel pressured to choose between leaving the community and remaining 
and suffering the reduction in the quality of life associated with rapid racial change in an 
area. Brief for Respondents at 21 n.11, citing Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1032 (E.D. 
Mich. 1975), aff'd and remanded, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1976). 
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C. Did the Court's own Prudential Limitations Prohibit 
Standing? 
811 
In addition to Article III considerations, the determination of 
standing involves passing on the applicability of prudentiallimita-
tions on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction. ISS These limita-
tions have been imposed by the federal courts themselves as a re-
straining measure. Prudential limitations serve a number of 
different purposes. They allow the courts to avoid deciding broad 
social questions where no individual rights would be vindicated by 
the decision. Furthermore, they limit access to federal courts to 
those persons best suited to bring a claim.Is7 
The prudential limitations generally take the form of two rules 
of thumb used by the federal courts. First, a litigant must assert an 
injury peculiar to himself or to the group of which he is a part 
rather than one shared by all citizens or a large class of citizens. ISS 
Second, the litigant must assert his own legal interests, not those 
of third parties. I •• 
Although Congress may never abrogate the Article III standing 
requirements, it "may by legislation expand standing to the full 
extent permitted by Article III. "170 In other words, Congress may 
1" See note 10 supra. 
187 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979). 
1 .. 441 U.S. 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-227 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 
418 U.S. 166, 188-97 (Powell, J., concurring) (1974); Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 
(1937). 
1 .. "Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional 
rights of some third party." Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). See 441 U.S. 91, 
100 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 253, 
263 (1977); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149-54 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 
U.S. 44 (1943). The Gladstone Court noted that in appropriate situations, a third nonconsti-
tutional limitation may be applicable, i.e., the plaintiff's interest must arguably be within 
the zone of interests to be regulated or protected by the statute under which the claim is 
made. 441 U.S. 91, 100, n.6 (1979). See e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976). The Court in Gladstone did not discuss whether the zone of interest 
test was applicable to the case at hand. 
170 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979). As the Court stated 
in Warth v. Seldin: 
In short the claim of these petitioners falls squarely within the prudential standing rule 
that normally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in order 
to obtain relief from injury to themselves. As we have observed above, this rule of judi-
cial self-governance is subject to exceptions, the most prominent of which is that Con-
gress may remove it by statute. 
422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975). 
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overide the prudential limitations and allow standing to litigants 
who would otherwise be barred from court by these rules. l7l 
The Supreme Court in Gladstone, found that the prudential lim-
itations posed no barrier to the exercise of its jurisdiction. The 
Court held that because sections 810 and 812 offer alternative rem-
edies to the same class of plaintiffs, standing under section 812 is 
as broad as standing under section 810.172 The Supreme Court had 
earlier decided in Trafficante that standing under section 810 is as 
broad as permitted by Article III and that prudential limitations 
are not applicable.178 By implication then, standing under section 
812 is as broad as permitted by the Constitution.174 
The Supreme Court's determination that the prudential limita-
tions of the federal courts on standing were not applicable, vali-
dated a similar finding by the Court of Appeals.1711 Having found 
that the plaintiffs in Gladstone satisfied both the constitutional 
and prudential requirements for standing, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Court of Appeals, stating that the District Court should 
not have entered summary judgment except possibly as to the two 
individual plaintiffs who resided outside the target area.176 
It appears that the individual plaintiffs in Gladstone satisfied 
both purposes underlying the prudential limitations. First, they as-
serted an injury peculiar to themselves.177 Second, as litigants, they 
171 The Court stated that: 
Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who would otherwise be 
barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Article Ill's requirement remains: the 
plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury 
shared by a large class of other possible litigants. E.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 
669 (1973). But so long as this requirement is satisfied, persons to whom Congress has 
granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to 
seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and indeed, may invoke 
the general public interest in support of their claim. 
See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 
737 (1972), and FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940). 
In several cases, the Supreme Court has dispensed with its prudential limitation that a 
litigant not assert the legal interests of third parties. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 
188 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,481 (1965); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 
249 (1953). 
I •• 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979). See text at notes 93-132 supra for a detailed discussion of why 
sections 810 and 812 offer alternative remedies. 
". Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). 
'" 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979) . 
... 441 U.S. 91, 98 (1979). 
I.' [d. at 115-116. 
m As the plaintiffs advanced in their brief at 16: 
In short, this case simply does not turn on the right of testers or absent third parties. 
1980] GLADSTONE REALTORS 813 
may be best suited to assert a fair housing claim.17S 
D. The Rehnquist Dissent 
Justice William Rehnquist entered a dissenting opinion in Glad-
stone,179 in which he maintained that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
under section 812.1S0 Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority 
What is involved is the right of homeowners in a specific village whose racial make-up is 
being fashioned by discriminatory housing practices to protect their substantial eco-
nomic and social interests in living in a stable, integrated community. 
Brief for Respondents at 16. 
Indeed, it is often the residents of a community and not the person steered who have the 
greatest stake in the enforcement of fair housing laws. Racial Discrimination, supra note 21, 
at 3ll. 
"" Individuals who have been subjected to racial discrimination by brokers may not have 
the resources to pursue a claim in the courts. Moreover, because of their lack of familiarity 
with local housing patterns, they may not even be aware that they have been steered. How-
ever "[c]itizens groups seeking to stablize racial balance in a changing neighborhood have 
the interest in and knowledge of the situation over a long period of time that is needed to 
substantiate charges of blockbusting, illegal solicitation, or other discriminatory real estate 
practices." [d . 
.. I He was joined in the di88enting opinion by Justice Potter Stewart. 
180 The restrictive view of standing expressed by Justice Rehnquist in his di88enting opin-
ion in Gladstone is consistent with his opinions in previous cases. In Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978), for example, Justice Rehnquist 
concurred in the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Burger. The majority overturned 
the decision of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, which had 
held that the Price-Anderson Act's limitation of $560 million on liability for nuclear acci-
dents at federally licensed nuclear plants violated the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Although it overturned the lower court, the majority in 
Duke Power held that the issues in the case were ripe for adjudication and that persons 
living near the proposed nuclear plants had standing to seek a declaratory judgment. 
While he agreed with the majority that the Act did not violate the Fifth Amendment, 
Justice Rehnquist further stated that the District Court was without jurisdiction. Justice 
Rehnquist added a strong note as to his views on the exercise of federal court jurisdiction: 
I can understand the Court's willingness to reach the merits of the case and thereby 
remove the doubt which has been cast over this important federal statute. In so doing, 
however, it ignores established limitations on district court jurisdiction as carefully de-
fined in our statutes and cases. Because I believe the preservation of these limitations is 
in the long run more important to this Court's jurisprudence than the resolution of any 
particular case or controversy, however important, I too, would reverse the judgment of 
the District Court, but would do so with instructions to dismiss the complaint for want 
of jurisdiction. (citations omitted) 
438 U.S. 59, 95-96 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
It has been suggested by one observer that a limited view of federal court jurisdiction is a 
key element of Justice Rehnquist's judicial philosophy. "A review of all the cases in which 
Justice Rehnquist has taken part indicates that his votes are guided by three basic proposi-
tions ... (3) Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction, whether on the district court, 
appellate court or Supreme Court level, should, whenever possible, be resolved against such 
exercise." Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293, 294 
(1976). Shapiro includes under the term "federal jurisdiction" the concepts of standing, jus-
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as to the proper construction of sections 810 and 812. Justice 
Rehnquist stated that although the sections provide alternative 
forms of relief, they are not necessarily equally available to both 
direct and indirect victims of housing discrimination.18l Justice 
Rehnquist interpreted section 812 as limited to the direct victims 
of discrimination, "that is, those actually discriminated against on 
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin"181 while 
construing section 810 as providing relief to anyone claiming to 
have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice, even if not 
directly discriminated against.183 
Justice Rehnquist based his construction of sections 810 and 812 
on several different factors. First, he noted that standing involves 
both constitutional and prudential elements.184 Congress can ex-
pressly disregard the prudential limitations on standing and per-
mit standing as broadly as Article III would permit. l811 Rehnquist 
claimed that Congress did this by inserting the words "person ag-
grieved" to refer to plaintiffs in section 810. The absence of this 
language in section 812 demonstrates a congressional intent not to 
abrogate the prudential standing restrictions nor authorize suits by 
those whom these limitations would otherwise bar.188 
Second, Congress contemplated that private suits under section 
812 could be instituted only by persons alleging injury to rights 
expressly "granted by" sections 803 through 806.187 Section 810, on 
the other hand, authorizes commencement of civil suits to enforce 
the rights "granted or protected by" the entire subchapter.188 The 
rights the respondents sought to protect were not granted by sec-
tions 803 through 806. These sections do not grant a right to reap 
the social or professional benefits of living in an integrated society 
nor the right of a municipality not to have its housing market ille-
gally manipulated by realtors.189 
ticiability, mootness, ripeness and equitable discretion. [d. at 274 nA. 
,., "That § 810 and § 812 are alternative remedial provisions does not, however, compel 
the conclusion that they are equally available to all potential Title VIII claimants." 441 U.S. 
91, 128 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
, •• [d. at 126. 
,., [d. 
, •• [d. at 119. 
,., [d. at 120. 
,., [d. at 123. 
187 [d. 
, •• [d. 
, •• [d. at 124. 
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Third, Justice Rehnquist referred to subsections 812(b) and (c) 
which authorize the appointment of counsel and recovery of com-
pensatory and punitive damages and costs and attorney's fees. leo 
He reasoned that only those directly discriminated against suffered 
injuries that would entitle them to such relief. leI 
Fourth, by making indirect victims of housing discrimination 
proceed under section 810 and exhaust informal conciliation and 
state and local remedies, Congress sought to facilitate informal res-
olution, foster state and local involvement and avoid federal inter-
vention.lel Permitting indirect victims of discrimination to sue 
under section 812 would make a mockery of the enforcement 
scheme of section 810, Rehnquist argued. Finally, Rehnquist cited 
statements made by Senators Miller and Hart in support of his 
view that section 812 is available only to the direct victiins of dis-
crimination.le8 Rehnquist concluded that because the plaintiffs 
JIG Section 812(b) reads: 
Upon application by the plaintiff and in such circumstances as the court may deem 
just, a court of the United States in which a civil action under this section has been 
brought may appoint an attorney for the plaintiff and may authorize the commencement 
of a civil action upon proper showing without the payment of costs, fees or security. A 
court of a State or subdivision thereof may do likewise to the extent not inconsistent 
with the law or procedures of the State or subdivision. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (1976). 
SeCtion 812(c) reads: 
The court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary 
injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order and may award to the plaintiff 
actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff: Provided That the 
said plaintiff in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume said attorney's 
fees. 
42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976). 
,., 441 U.S. 91, 126 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
'" [d. 
'" Senator Miller introduced an amendment to section 810. The amendment, which was 
adopted, required exhaustion of "substantially equivalent" state and local remedies before a 
suit could be filed in federal court. Senator Miller noted: 
I provide in the second part of my amendment that no civil action be brought in any 
U.S. district court if the person aggrieved has a judicial remedy under a state or local 
housing law which provides substantially equivalent rights and remedies to this Act. 
I believe it is a matter of letting the State and local courts have jurisdiction. We in the 
Senate lmow that our federal district court calendars are crowded enough without adding 
to that load, if there is a good remedy under state law. 
114 CONGo RBc. 4987 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Miller). 
According to Senator Hart, the amendment, "recognizes the desire all of us share that the 
State remedies, where adequate, be availed of and that unnecessarily burdening litigation 
not further clog the court calendars." 
114 CONGo RBc. 4987 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Hart). 
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were not direct victims they lacked standing to sue under section 
812.194 
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF Gladstone 
As Gladstone is so recently decided, its impact on the future 
case law is yet undetermined. Only two subsequent decisions have 
cited Gladstone for what it said about standing to sue in the fair 
housing context.1911 In Broadmore Improvement Association, Inc. 
v. Stan Weber & Associates, Inc.,!" the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit granted standing to a nonprofit corporation com-
prised mainly of residents of a particular New Orleans neighbor-
hood dedicated to preserving its integrated character. Under sec-
tion 812, the corporation sued a realtor allegedly engaged in 
blockbusting with the intended effect of steering blacks to and 
whites from the neighborhood. The court noted that residents of 
the target area and the affected municipality have, in light of 
, .. 441 U.S. 91, 129 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also stated that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. That section secures only, "the right 
to be free from racially motivated interference with property rights." Plaintiffs have suffered 
no injury to that right, Rehnquist found. He also noted that the Court had previously held 
that section 1982, "does not give residents of certain communities an actionable right to be 
free from the adverse consequences of racially discriminatory practices directed at and im-
mediately harmful to others." Id. at 129. See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490-530 
(1975). 
, •• Several courts have cited Gladstone regarding the general standing requirements 
under Article III and prudential limitations on standing. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979) for example, the Supreme Court cited Gladstone for the phrase, "personally has suf-
fered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the punitively illegal conduct of the 
defendant." Id. at 2274 n.18 (1979). This case involved a suit by a discharged employee of 
former Rep. Otto Passman who claimed that her dismissal amounted to discrimination on 
account of sex. Id. at 2269 (1979). 
In Boating Industry Associations v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1979) the court 
stated that the Supreme Court in Gladstone repeated its analysis that the constitutional 
limitations on standing require that the plaintiff demonstrate that he suffered actual or 
threatened injury because of the defendant's illegal conduct. Id. at 1381. This case involved 
the standing of boating associations to challenge a regulation of the Secretary of Labor in-
terpreting certain provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act as applicable to marina owners and recreational boat manufacturers. 
In In re Godfrey, 472 F. Supp. 364 (M.D. Ala. 1979), a case involving the standing of a 
district attorney to challenge the order of a bankruptcy judge as to dischargeability, the 
court cited Gladstone for the proposition that standing doctrine requires a litigant to assert 
his own legal interests, not those of third parties. Id. at 369. 
In Featherstone v. Liberty Cash Grocers, 82 F.R.D. 484 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) the court cited 
Gladstone for the proposition that the private right of action under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 arises only after a period of 180 days. Id. at 485. This case involved a suit 
by a black employee who was discharged by his employer on allegedly racial grounds. 
, .. 597 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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Gladstone, standing under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1968.197 The court also cited Gladstone as authority for the pro-
position that both sections 812 and 810 provide standing to the 
fullest extent possible under Article 111.198 
In Angell v. Zinsser,199 the court cited the Gladstone decision 
after a discussion of its contention that if courts grant relief only 
when plaintiffs make out a clear case on the record, this will pre-
vent suits where decisions to zone out low-income housing are 
founded on unproved yet widely acknowledged racial discrimina-
tion.20o The court also cited Gladstone after discussing the claim of 
one of the plaintiffs that she and her children would receive social 
and psychological benefits from official efforts to alleviate racially 
exclusive zoning patterns in their town.201 
Although it is hoped that the Gladstone decision will help elimi-
nate the prevalence of racial steering, this remains to be seen. It 
was recently suggested that even after the decision, housing pat-
terns in the Chicago suburbs including Bellwood remain segregated 
some eleven years after the fair housing legislation was passed.202 
The Court in Gladstone added an additional remedy in the form 
of section 812 to those residents and local governments who would 
seek to challenge steering by realtors. As indirect victims of hous-
ing discrimination, they may now proceed directly to the courts 
without first having to attempt administrative mediation of their 
complaints or pursue available state and local remedies. It has 
been suggested that the administrative procedure provided for in 
section 810 can be most time-consuming and "clearly is not a suit-
able enforcement mechanism for anyone facing a situation of some 
, •• [d. at 570. 
, •• [d. 
, .. 473 F. Supp. 488 (D. Conn. 1979). 
100 [d. at 494. 
I.' [d. at 501. 
1.1 According to one commentator: 
. . . It takes but minor observation to discover that little has been accomplished to-
ward the eradication of housing segregation in Illinois, particularly in the metropoli-
tan Chicago area. One visit to this area is sufficient to reveal that racial segregation is 
now, more than ever, firmly established. The situation is not solely confined to the 
city of Chicago, for the recent resegregation of practically the entire south and west 
sides of the city has now brought the issue of racial segregation to the doors of white 
suburbia. 
Stake, Fair Housing in Illinois: The Role of Municipal Government in the Desegregation of 
Metropolitan Communities, 67 ILL. BAR J. 352 (1979). 
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urgency."lIOa Allowing complainants to by-pass section 810 proce-
dures may help communities act quickly to forestall the attempts 
of local realtors to manipulate the present racial balance. 
For those who believe that "if the real estate industry is allowed 
to operate unchecked, the pace of racial transition will be manipu-
lated in a way that will irrevocably distort any chance for normal 
and suitable racial change",lI04 the expansion of the class of plain-
tiffs who may sue under section 812 is a step forward. For those 
who believe that realtors are the only means by which minorities 
can pry open the door to suburban communities, the Gladstone 
decision may have a less salutory effect. In any event, only with the 
passage of time will the exact impact of Gladstone be determined. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's decision in Gladstone v. Village of Bell-
wood had the effect of expanding the class of plaintiffs who may 
pursue direct judicial relief under section 812 of the Fair Housing 
Act of 1968. Whereas the lower courts had previously gone in con-
tradictory directions, the Gladstone decision confirmed the availa-
bility of section 812 relief to both direct and indirect victims of 
discrimination. The decision also validated the findings of several 
of the lower courts that standing under section 812, like standing 
under section 810 is as broad as permissible under Article III. In 
essence, as long as the plaintiff meets the constitutional require-
ments of injury in fact and causation, the courts' own prudential 
limitations pose no barrier to pursuing an action in the courts. 
The practice of racial steering formed the basis of the dispute in 
Gladstone. In deciding the case, the Court examined the Fair 
Housing Act under which the suit was brought and previous inter-
pretations given to the statute's two enforcement sections. The 
Court addressed three major issues in Gladstone, which were; (1) 
the proper construction to be given sections 810 and 812, (2) 
whether the plaintiffs satisfied Article III standing requirements 
and (3) whether the Court's own prudential limitations posed any 
barrier to standing. Few cases subsequent to Gladstone have made 
use of what the case said about standing in fair housing litigation. 
The decision, however, will undoubtedly have the effect of al-
lOa Racial Discrimination, supra note 27 at 301. See the detailing of administrative proce-
dures outlined in this article. 
- Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1034 (E.D. Mich. 1975). 
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lowing a wider range of plaintiffs, specifically the indirect victims 
of housing discrimination, to seek judicial relief under the Fair 
Housing Act. In increasing the ease with which such plaintiffs may 
bring suit to enforce the provisions of the Act, the decision lends 
additional credence to the guarantees of freedom of choice in hous-
ing contained in the Act. Although it will not by itself eliminate 
steering, perhaps Gladstone will provide the impetus for the 
achievement of the long-delayed goal of fair housing for all 
Americans. 
